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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INCREASING SENTENCES ON APPELLATE
REVIEW
GREGORY P. DUNSKY*
The National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, in its Study Draft of a New Federal
Criminal Code, recommended denying federal ap-
pellate courts the power to increase criminal sen-
tences on appeal.' Peter W. Low, Professor at the
University of Virginia School of Law and consult-
ant to the commission, explained that:
As a matter of principle, it could be argued rather
convincingly that the government should be entitled
to take an appeal seeking an increase if it feels that
the sentence of the court is too low. It is clear,
however, that such a provision would offend the constitu-
tional prohibition against double jeopardy.'
The United States Senate's Committee on the Ju-
diciary, in its Report to Accompany S. 1, came to
the opposite conclusion regarding the constitution-
ality of an appellate court's increase of a sentence
on appeal. It stated that, "Provided due process
considerations are observed, increasing the sentence
should be entirely permissible."' Section 3725 of the
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 (S. 1437) 4
* B. A., University of Dayton; J. D., University of
Michigan. This article originated as a paper written for
and discussed in a Sentencing and Corrections Seminar
conducted by Professor Peter Westen of the University
of Michigan Law School. The author is deeply indebted
io Professor Westen for the time and energy he spent
unraveling the vagaries of the double jeopardy clause.
I "With respect to the controversial issue as to whether
the appellate court should be able to increase, as well as
decrease, the sentence, this draft would deny it the power
to increase." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Comment, at 311.
22 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1970)
1335 (emphasis added).
'SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG.,
ls-r SFSs.. REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM Acr OF 1975, at 1052 n.18 (Comm.
Print.1975) (emphasis added).
4 The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975 (S. 1) was
introduced into the 95th Congress (1st Sess.) as the
Criminal Reform Act of 1977 (S. 1437). This bill is
expected to go to the Senate floor early in 1978.
would empower federal appellate courts to increase
criminal sentences on appeal in certain cases.5
This article will discuss whether it is a violation
of the double jeopardy or due process clauses of
the United States Constitution to permit an appel-
late court to increase a defendant's sentence on
appeal without any new evidence to support the
5 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94th CONG.,
lsr SESS., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1, CRIMINAl.
JUSTICE REFORM Ac'r OF 1975, at 1052 n.18 (Comm.
Print).
§ 3725. REVIEW OF A SENTENCE OTHER
THAN A SENTENCE OF DEATH.
(b) APPEAL BY THE GOVERNMENT-The
government may, with the approval of the Attorney
General or his designee, file a notice of appeal in
the district court for review of a final sentence
imposed for a felony if the sentence includes a fine
or a term of imprisonment or a term of parole
ineligibility lower than the minimum established in
the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a) (I), and
that are found by the sentencing court to be appli-
cable to the case, unless:
(1) the sentence is consistent with policy state-
ments issued by the Sentencing Commission to
28 U.S.C. 994(a) (2);
(2) the sentence is equal to or greater than the
sentence recommended or not opposed by the
attorney for the government pursuant to a plea
agreement under Rule I I(e) (1) (B) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(3) the sentence is equal to that provided in
an accepted plea agreement pursuant to Rule
11(e) (1) (C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(e) DECISION AND DISPOSITION-If the
court of appeals determines that the setence is:
(1) clearly unreasonable it shall state specific
reasons for its conclusions and:
(B) if it determines that the sentence is too
low and the appeal has been filed under subsec-
tion (b), shall set aside the sentence and:
(i) remand the case for imposition of a
greater sentence;
(ii) remand the case for further sentencing
proceedings; or
(iii) impose a greater sentence;
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increase. This article considers the question of the
constitutionality of Section 3725 of S. 1437 as well
as the constitutionality of current statutes provid-
ing for increase of sentences on appeal.
Two federal statutes currently allow for in-
creased sentences on review.6 Both permit increased
sentences for dangerous offenders on appeal when
a petition for review of the sentence is filed by the
government. Six states and two commonwealths
provide for appellate increase of sentences, as well.
In Alaska, both the government and the defendant
may appeal the criminal sentence in certain cases.
However, an appellate court may increase the sen-
tence only when both the state and the defendant
appeal the sentence. Should the state alone appeal
the sentence, the appellate court's decision that
the original sentence was too lenient is only advi-
sory.7 Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana and New Hampshire em-
power appellate courts to increase sentences in
certain cases as well.' In these states, however, only
the defendant may bring an appeal to review a
sentence. In Colorado, a sentence may be increased
only on proof of aggravation.
9
6 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1970) and 21 USC § 849 (1970).
Section 3376 and § 849(h) are virtually identical.
§ 3576. REVIEW OF SENTENCE
With respect to the imposition, correction, or
reduction of a sentence ... a review of the sentence
on the record of the sentencing court may be taken
by the defendant or the United States to a court of
appeals.... The court of appeals on review of the
sentence may... impose or direct the imposition of
any sentence which the sentencing court could orig-
inally have imposed, or remand for further sentenc-
ing proceedings and imposition of sentence, except
that a sentence may be made more severe only on
review of the sentence taken by the United States
and after hearing.
7
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1969).
§ 12.55.120 APPEAL OF SENTENCE
(b) A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed
by the superior court may be appealed to the su-
preme court by the state on the ground that the
sentence is too lenient; however, when a sentence is
appealed by the state and the defendant has not
appealed the sentence, the court is not authorized
to increase the sentence but may express its approval
or disapproval of the sentence and its reasons in a
written opinion.
8 MONT REV. CODE §§ 95-2501 to 95-2504 (1947)
are patterned after CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194
to 51-197 (1960). MD ANN. CODE. art. 27, §§ 645 JA to
645 JG (1976) are patterned after MAss. GEN. LAWS.
ch. 278, §§ 28A to 28D (1968). ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 2141 to 2144 (1970), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN
§§ 651:57 to 651:61 (1975), COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-I-
409 (1973).
9 1d. § 18-1-409 (3):
No sentence in excess of the one originally imposed
The commentators are divided on the question
of the constitutionality of statutory schemes pro-
viding for increase of sentences on appeal.10 More-
over, the American Bar Association has had a
difficult time wrestling with this question.', It is
the opinion of the author of this article that the
Constitution presents no barriers to a statutory
scheme providing for increase of sentences on ap-
peal.
The question of the constitutionality of an in-
crease of sentence on appeal is of more than aca-
demic interest. A recent law review article t2 re-
ported that in five percent of the sentence appeals
decided by the Alaska Supreme Court during the
first five years of that state's appellate review stat-
ute, the Alaska Supreme Court disapproved of the
shall be given unless matters of aggravation in ad-
dition to those known to the court at the time of
the original sentence are brought to the attention
of the court during the hearing conducted under
this section. If the court imposes a sentence in excess
of the one first given, it shall specifically identify
the additional aggravating facts considered by it in
imposing the increased sentence.
10 See Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review
of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS. L. REV. 207, 224-25 (1971)
("The validity of an increased sentence is somewhat
uncertain .... Considering the possible double jeopardy
questions ... it seems preferable to discard the power to
increase ... .'); Crystal, The Proposed Federal CriminalJus-
tice Reform Act of 1975: Sentencing-Law and Order With a
Vengeance, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 33, 70-77 (1975)
(increasing a sentence on appeal is multiple punishment
and therefore violative of the double jeopardy clause.);
Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A
Return to the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REV.
463, 511 (1974) ("Until the Supreme Court speaks fur-
ther, there appears to be no constitutional prohibition
against statutorily empowering appellate courts to in-
crease sentences."); Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences:
Penology on theJudicial Doorstep, 68 J. CRIM. L. & C. 122,
127-28 (1977) ("The right of the state to appeal the
leniency of a sentence is one of the most controversial
aspects of appellate review of sentences."); Note, Twice
in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REV.
325 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy], (S. l's
appellate review of sentences proposal is antagonistic to
the double jeopardy and due process clauses.).
11 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLAi-E RE-
VIEW OF SENTENCES (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA
PROJECT]. The Advisory Committee, noting constitu-
tional problems in the area, would have prohibited an
appellate court from increasing a sentence on appeal
(Standard 3.4 Limitation on available dispositions). The
Special Committee, however, in its Proposed Revisions
of Standards, voted to eliminate Standard 3.4, thereby
allowing appellate courts to increase sentences on appeal.
See id. at 54-66 & supplement.
'2 Erwin, Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5
UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1975).
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trial court's sentence as being too lenient.' 3 As
noted above,14 that court cannot increase a sen-
tence on appeal unless it is appealed by both the
state and the defendant. It is likely that Alaska
would allow for an increase of sentence on appeal
by the government alone if it were clear that such
an increase of sentence were constitutional. More-
over, it is likely that other states would follow suit
if the question of the constitutionality of an in-
creased sentence on appeal was decided in favor
of such an increase.
The American Bar Association's Advisory Com-
mittee on Sentencing and Review noted that, "Per-
haps the most controversial question involved in
the decision to provide for sentence review is
whether the reviewing court should be authorized
to increase the penalty imposed by the sentencing
court."' 5 The constitutionality of such authoriza-
tion is a question which every state legislature must
face if it considers enacting a system of appellate
review of sentences which includes the power to
increase sentences on appeal.
I. APPELLATE INCREASE OF SENTENCES AND
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
It is often argued that the doublejeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution prohibits an increase of sentence on ap-
peal. I shall examine the double jeopardy argu-
ments that have been advanced and determine
whether the double jeopardy clause presents any
special problems for statutory schemes providing
for increase of sentences on appeal by the govern-
ment.
A. Introduction
In the early 1960's, two state supreme courts
held that double jeopardy does not prohibit an
increase of sentence on appeal by defendant. This
was the holding of both the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Hicks v. Commonwealth'6
and the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
in Kohlfuss v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison.'7 In
Hicks, the defendant pleaded guilty to four indict-
ments charging armed robbery and was sentenced
to concurrent prison terms of from fifteen to twenty
years on each indictment. The defendant appe led
13 Id. at 3.
14 ALASKA STAT., § 12.55.120 (1969).
"5 ABA PROJECT, supra note 11, at 55.
16 345 Mass. 89, 185 N.E.2d 739 (1962), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 839 (1963).
17 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626 (1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 928 (1962).
his sentences to the Appellate Division, which in-
creased his sentences to from twenty to twenty-five
years. On appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, the defendant argued that the Appellate
Division's harsher sentence placed him twice in
jeopardy, in contravention of the fifth amendment.
The court held that the substitute sentences did
not constitute doiible jeopardy.'8 In concluding
that the legislature properly granted the Appellate
Division "continuing jurisdiction to revise a sen-
tence on appeal by defendant," the court analo-
gized the defendant's situation to that of a retrial
following a successful appeal of conviction:
Had the petitioner been convicted and sentenced
and if 9n his appeal the conviction had been re-
versed, a subsequent conviction followed by a longer
sentence than the one initially imposed would not
be objectionable. We are of opinion that when a
convicted defendant resorts to the statutory proce-
dure prescribed by §§ 28A-28D for review of a
sentence he assumes the same risks inherent in an
appeal from a conviction.'
9
The Massachusetts court's rationale was this: If
the prohibition against double jeopardy does not
provide that the sentence originally imposed by
the trial judge is a ceiling for any subsequent
sentencing of defendant on retrial following suc-
cessful appeal of the original conviction, then the
prohibition does not demand that the original
sentence be a ceiling when the Appellate Division
considers defendant's sentence on appeal by de-
fendant. Either an increase in sentence is permis-
sible in both situations, or it is prohibited in both
situations. The Hicks Court held that the increase
is permissible in both situations.
In Kohlfuss, the defendant pleaded guilty to a
charge of robbery and was sentenced to a term of
from two to seven years imprisonment. He filed a
petition for review of his sentence by the superior
court, which ordered his sentence to be increased
to a term of from three to seven years. The defend-
ant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
that the increase of sentence caused him to be put
twice in jeopardy. His application for the writ was
denied, and the Connecticut Supreme Court heard
"'The Massachusetts Supreme Court expressly de-
clined to decide whether the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution protects citizens against
double jeopardy in state criminal proceedings. 185
N.E.2d at 740. This question was answered affirmatively
by the United States Supreme Court in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
19 185 N.E.2d at 740-41.
1978]
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his double jeopardy arguments on appeal.20 The
court, relying heavily on federal cases, 21 concluded
that since the double jeopardy clause does not
prohibit a convicted person from initiating pro-
ceedings which result in a heavier penalty, (i.e., a
person may appeal his conviction, be retried and
convicted, and sentenced to a longer sentence than
initially imposed), doublejeopardy prohibitions do
not prevent a larger sentence being imposed where
the defendant appeals his sentence.
B. The Double Jeopardy Principle of the Finality of a
Verdict of Acquittal
The Advisory Committee on Sentencing and
Review of the American Bar Association noted
that the rationale of Green v. United States' under-
cuts the rationale of the Kohlfuss and Hicks cases. 2
In order to thoroughly examine this argument, an
examination of some earlier United States Supreme
Court opinions is required.
The Advisory Committee's view rests upon
United States v. Ball.24 In Ball, Millard Ball, John
Ball and Robert Boutwell were tried in United
States Circuit Court for the murder of William
Box. The jury found John Ball and Robert
Boutwell guilty as charged, but found Millard Ball
not guilty. John Ball and Robert Boutwell success-
fully appealed their convictions, and subsequently
new indictments were returned against all three
defendants. Millard Ball filed a plea of previous
jeopardy and acquittal, which was rejected by the
second trial court. The jury in the second trial
found Millard Ball and the other two defendants
guilty. Millard Ball appealed his conviction to the
United States Supreme Court, arguing that he had
been placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense,
in violation of the fifth amendment. The Court,
in reversing the conviction, held the general verdict
of acquittal upon the issue of guilt in the first trial




2 This was a pre-Benton z,. Marland case and did not
deal directly with the federal double jeopardy clause.
The Connecticut Supreme Court viewed the defendant's
double jeopardy arguments as arising from common law
protections which had been largely adopted by the due
process guarantee of Article 1, § 9 of the Connecticut
Constitution. 183 A.2d at 627.
21 The court cited Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S.
15 (1919); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896);
and Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900), 183
A.2d at 628.
ar 3 5 5 U.S. 184 (1957).
24 ABA PRoJEc-r, supra note 11. at 63.
24 163 U.S. 662 (1896).25 1d. at 671.
The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be
reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him
twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Consti-
tution.... [I]n this country a verdict of acquittal,
although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
26
This principle of the finality of a verdict of
acquittal in criminal cases was applied by the
Supreme Court in Kepner v. United States.2 7 In Kepner,
the defendant was charged with having embezzled
his client's funds. He was tried and acquitted by
a court of first instance in Manila, Philippine
Islands.' In accordance with the procedure pro-
vided in amendments to the Philippine Criminal
Code of Procedure,2 the United States appealed
the defendant's acquittal to the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands. That court reversed the
defendant's acquittal, found him guilty as charged
and sentenced him to imprisonment. The defend-
ant appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that he had been put in
jeopardy a second time by the appellate proceed-
ings, in violation of the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court, relying upon Ball, held that the
government appeal upon acquittal constituted
double jeopardy for the same offense:
3
21 Id. The Ball case is better known for the proposition
that defendant can be retried following reversal of his
conviction.
27 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
'The Philippine Islands were then possessions of the
United States. They were acquired by cession under the
treaty of peace executed at Paris, between the United
States and Spain, on Dec. 10, 1898. Id. at 111.
2 Military Order Number 58 (Apr. 23, 1900) amended
the Philippine Criminal Code of Procedure. Section 44
empowered either party in a criminal case to appeal a
final judgment of the court of first instance. See 195 U.S.
at 111-13.
3o Specifically, the Supreme Court held that § 44 of
Military Order Number 58, insofar as it permitted an
appeal by the government after acquittal, was repealed
by § 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which inter
alia, provided to the citizens of the Philippines the pro-
tections of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 195 U.S. at 133-
34. Although the Court was interpreting the statutory
language of the Act of Congress, the Court decided the
case as though it was interpreting the double jeopardy
clause itself. See id. at 124, 133. In United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the Court stated "we accept
Kepner as having correctly stated the relevant double
jeopardy principles." Id. at 346 n. 15. Last term, in United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977), the Court stated, "Perhaps the most fundamental
rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has
been that '[a] verdict of acquittal ... could not be re-
viewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defend-
ant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Consti-
(Vol. 69
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The Ball case ... establishes that to try a man after
a verdict of acquittal is to put him twice in jeopardy,
although the verdict was not followed by judgment.
That is practically the case under consideration,
viewed in the most favorable aspect for the Govern-
ment. The court of first instance, having jurisdiction
to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again
upon the merits, even in an appellate court, is to
put him a second time in jeopardy for the same
offense .... 31
Justice Holmes dissented, arguing that the defend-
ant was not placed twice in jeopardy by the gov-
ernment's appeal because the defendant's jeopardy
was a continuing one:
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its
beginning to the end of the cause. Everybody agrees
that the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding
a trial in a new and independent case where a man
already had been tried once. But there is no rule
that a man may not be tried twice in the same
case.... If a statute should give the right to take
exceptions to the Government, I believe it would
be impossible to maintain that the prisoner would
be protected by the Constitution from being tried
again. He no more would be in jeopardy a second
time when retried because of a mistake of law in
his favor, than he would be when retried for a
mistake that did him harm.
2
In Trono v. United States,a3 the Supreme Court
examined the scope of the Kepner rule. There, three
defendants were tried in the province of Bulacan,
Philippine Islands, for the murder of Benito Perez.
They were acquitted of the crime of murder, but
were convicted of the crime of assault, a lesser
included offense, and were sentenced to six months
imprisonment and the payment of fines. The de-
fendants appealed their convictions to the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands, which reversed
the judgment of the trial court and convicted them
of second degree murder. The defendants were
sentenced to the payment of fines and prison terms
of eight years and one day for one defendant and
fourteen years, eight months and one day for the
other two defendants. All three appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, arguing that their
murder convictions, imposed by the Philippine
Islands Supreme Court after acquittal by the court
of first instance, placed them twice in jeopardy for
tution.' United States v. Ball ... See also Kepner v.
United States." (Citations omitted).
31 195 U.S. at 133.
3Id. at 134-35.
33 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
the same offense.' The Supreme Court held that
the prohibition against double jeopardy did not
prohibit the Philippines from convicting the de-
fendants of the higher offense on appeal.
35 The
Court distinguished Kepner from this case on the
basis of there being a "vital difference" between
an attempt by the government to review the verdict
and action by a defendant in appealing from the
judgment. ' The Court explained that:
[T]he accused waives the right to thereafter plead
once in jeopardy, when he has obtained a reversal
of the judgment, even as to that part of it which
acquitted him of the higher while convicting him of
the lower offense. When at his own request he has
obtained a new trial he must take the burden with
the benefit, and go back for a new trial of the whole
case.
37
The rationale of the Court was that a defendant,
in appealing his conviction, waived the doublejeop-
ardy protections created not only by his previous
conviction of assault, but also those created by his
acquittal of the murder charge. The Court ex-
pressly rejected the argument that a defendant, by
appealing his conviction, waived only his double
jeopardy protections which arose from the prior
conviction and not those that arose from his acquit-
tal of the murder charge.
3
8
Justice Harlan and two other Justices dis-
sented.' They argued that Kepner governed this
case, that the defendant's acquittal of the murder
charge in the lower court created a bar to defend-
ant's being again tried on the murder charge. They
rejected the waiver theory of the majority:
An accused would not purposely and consciously
appeal from an acquittal of a grave crime and cast
from himself the immunity that such an acquittal
gives him. Should such consent be imputed? ... (A]
defendant should not be required to give up the
protection of ajust ... acquittal of one crime as the
I Once again, the Court viewed the double jeopardy
issue in terms of § 5 of the 1902 Act of Congress. Id. at
528. See also note 30 supra. The Court specifically noted
that in Kepner, the double jeopardy language in the 1902
statute was construed as "the same phrase would be
construed in the instrument from which it was originally
taken, viz., the Constitution of the United States ....
Id. at 529.
-5Id. at 535.
36 Id. at 529-30.
31 Id. at 534.
-1 Id. at 533.
' Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a separate dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 535-37. Mr. Justice White joined Mr. Justice
McKenna's dissent. Id. at 537-40.
19781
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price of obtaining a review of an unjust conviction
of another crime.'
Justice Holmes concurred in the result without
writing an opinion.4 Presumably, his rationale was
the continuing jeopardy rationale explicated in his
Kepner dissent.
The holding of the Supreme Court in Green v.
United States4" is directly contrary to the holding
in Trono. In Green, defendant was tried in the Dis-
trict of Columbia for arson and the murder of a
woman who died in the fire. The jury found the
defendant guilty of arson and of second degree
murder. The defendant was sentenced to from one
to three years imprisonment for arson and to from
five to twenty years for murder in the second
degree. The court of appeals, on defendant's ap-
peal, reversed his conviction for second degree
murder and remanded the case for a new trial.
4 3
On remand, the defendant was tried for first degree
murder under the original indictment. The new
trial court overruled his plea of former jeopardy,
and the new jury found him guilty of first degree
murder. The defendant was sentenced to death.
The court of appeals affirmed this conviction, re-
lying on Trono.' On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the defendant argued that he was placed twice in
jeopardy, in violation of the fifth amendment,
when he was retried for first degree murder after
his successful appeal of the second degree murder
conviction. The Court reversed the defendant's
conviction, holding that the second trial for first
degree murder was double jeopardy.4 5 Citing Ball
and Kepner, the Court noted that, "[ilt has long
been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a
v-rdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's
jeopardy, and even when 'not followed by any
judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for
the same offense.' '"46 Moreover, the Court ex-
plained that the original jury's verdict of guilty of
second degree murder contained an implicit acquittal
on the charge of first degree murder.4 7 This implicit
acquittal provided double jeopardy protection for
the defendant in the same way that the express
acquittals in Ball and Kepner protected the defend-
ants there. The Court concluded: "Therefore it
40 Id. at 538-39.
' Id. at 535.
42 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
43 218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
45 355 U.S. at 198.46 1d. at 188.47 1d. at 190.
seems clear, under established principles of former
jeopardy, that Green's jeopardy for first degree
murder came to an end when the jury was dis-
charged so that he could not be retried for that
offense."" Rather than expressly overruling Trono,
the Court chose to limit that case to its particular
factual setting. "All that was before the Court in
Trono was a statutory provision against double
jeopardy pertaining to the Philippine Islands-a
territory just recently conquered with long-estab-
lished legal procedures that were alien to the com-
mon law."
49
Green was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Price v. Georgia.50 In Price, the defendant was
charged with murder, but was only convicted of
voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to from ten
to fifteen years imprisonment. Following the de-
fendant's successful appeal of his conviction,51 he
was retried for murder and once again was con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced
to ten years imprisonment. The Supreme Court
held that even though the defendant was not con-
victed of the higher offense (murder) on retrial,
he was placed twice in jeopardy:
Although the petitioner was not convicted of the
greater charge on retrial, whereas Green was, the
risk of conviction on the greater charge was the
same in both cases, and the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is written in terms of po-
tential or risk of trial and conviction, not punish-
ment.
52
The rule that the fact-finder's verdict of acquittal
on the issue of guilt provides finality in a case
which cannot be destroyed by the government or
defendant on appeal is well established. It matters
not whether the acquittal is express or implicit.
An acquittal on the issue of guilt by the fact-finder
provides the defendant with a constitutional bar
to any subsequent retrial for the same offense.
53
1. The American Bar Association's Advisory Committee
on Sentencing and Review's Argument
48Id. at 191.49 Id. at 197.
50 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
51 Price v. State, 108 Ga. App. 581, 133 S.E.2d 916
(1963).
52 398 U.S. at 329.
0 In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., the Supreme
Court held that the double jeopardy clause also bars
government appeal from an acquittal entered by a federal
district court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure




The argument of the ABA's Advisory Committee
builds on the principle of finality. Justice Frank-
furter, dissenting in Green, argued against any dis-
tinction as to when increased sentences for the same
crime are permitted:
As a practical matter, and on any basis of human
values, it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case in
which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense
from one in which he is convicted of an offense that
has the same name as that of which he was previ-
ously convicted but carries a significantly different
punishment ....
In other words, "For practical purposes, Green was
no doubt more concerned about the amount of
punishment he would receive if convicted lawfully
under a first-degree murder charge than he was
about the formal label placed on his criminal
act." This is precisely the concern of most crimi-
nal defendants-what punishment is likely to be
imposed upon conviction? The argument is that
since the double jeopardy clause prohibits the re-
trial of a defendant on a higher offense once he
has been acquitted of that offense, the double
jeopardy clause also prohibits the imposition of a
more severe sentence on retrial than was initially
imposed. For, when a particular penalty is imposed
upon the defendant, the judge or jury is impliedly
acquitting him of a greater penalty, just as Green
was impliedly acquitted by the jury of the higher
offense. 
6
The California Supreme Court accepted this
argument in People v. Henderson. 7 There, the court
held that the imposition of the death penalty on
defendant on retrial, after the reversal of the first
judgment sentencing defendant to life imprison-
ment, was a violation of double jeopardy prohibi-
tions.' Justice Traynor, for the court, explained
that this conclusion followed from the rule of Green
v. United States.
Green ... [has] now established that a reversed con-
viction of a lesser degree of a crime precludes con-
viction of a higher degree on retrial.... It is imma-
355 U.S. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Appellate Review of Sentences, Hearings on S. 2722 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciar, 89th Cong, 2d Sess. 106
(1966) (statement of Professor George).
56 See Van Alstyn, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties
and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606,
634-635 (1965).
5760 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677
(1963).
6 386 P.2d at 686.
terial to the basic purpose of the constitutional pro-
vision against double jeopardy whether the Legisla-
ture divides a crime into different degrees carrying
different punishments or allows the court or jury to
fix different punishments for the same crime5 9
The conclusion of the California Supreme Court
reflected Justice Frankfurter's view. Since the real
concern of defendants is the amount of punishment
they will receive upon conviction, the double jeop-
ardy clause prohibits the imposition of a higher
sentence on retrial. This is so regardless of whether
the higher sentence is the result of the judge or
jury fixing the punishment or the result of a de-
fendant's being convicted on a more serious legis-
latively distinguished offense, with its accompany-
ing higher punishment.
Since the imposition of a particular sentence on
a defendant implies that he is acquitted of any
charge which is deseiving of a higher punishment,
and since this implicit acquittal bars a more severe
sentence on retrial, it also bars an increase of
sentence on appeal. For, as the state supreme courts
explained in Hicks and Kohlfuss, either an increased
sentence is permissible in both situations, or it is
prohibited in both. The conclusion of the Henderson
Court is that it is prohibited in both situations.
2. Rejection of the ABA 's Advisory Committee's Argument
The ABA Advisory Committee's argument is
difficult to reconcile with the holding of the Su-
preme Court in Stroud v. United States.'" In Stroud,
the defendant, a federal prisoner, was indicted for
the murder of a prison guard. He was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to be hanged.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment, and
the defendant was tried again. At the second trial,
the defendant was again found guilty of first degree
murder, but the jury verdict's recommendation
was against capital punishment. The defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment. This convic-
tion was reversed on appeal, 6' and the defendant
was tried a third time for murder. At the third
trial, the defendant was once again found guilty
of first degree murder. The jury made no recom-
mendation regarding capital punishment and the
defendant was sentenced to death. The defendant
appealed this conviction to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the third trial placed him twice in
jeopardy.
59 Id.
251 U.S. 15 (1919).
61 Stroud v. United States, 245 F. 990 (8th Cir. 1916).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction,' rejecting his double jeopardy argu-
ment. Noting that in each of the trials the convic-
tion was for the same offense, first degree murder,
the Court explained that the jury in the second
trial merely made a recommendation regarding
punishment. It had the right to do so under federal
law. The Court refused to read an implicit acquittal
of the higher penalty into this action by the jury.
The Court noted, "The fact that the jury may
thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment for
life did not render the conviction less than one for
first-degree murder. ' The Court relied upon Trono
to support its holding that there was no violation
of the double jeopardy clause in the case. "[T]he
plaintiff in error himself invoked the action of the
court which resulted in a further trial. In such
cases he is not placed in second jeopardy within
the meaning of the Constitution. Trono v. United
States.... "6
The impact of Stroud on the ABA Advisory Com-
mitee's argument was thought to be very slight.
Justice Traynor in Henderson, argued that because
Stroud relied upon Trono and the scope of Trono was
narrowed in Green, Green vitiated the rationale of
Stroud. Therefore, any doubt cast by Stroud upon
the implicit acquittal theory of Henderson was neg-
ligible.' The impact of Stroud cannot be said to
be neutralized by Green, however. In Green, the
Court expressly distinguished Stroud from that case
saying, "Stroud v. United States ... is clearly distin-
guishable. In that case a defendant was retried for
first degree murder after he had successfully asked
an appellate court to set aside a prior conviction
for that same offense."' If the rationale of Green
had vitiated the rationale of Stroud, the Court
would not have expressly stated that the two cases
were distinguishable.
North Carolina v. Pearce67 increased the doubt cast
by Stroud. In Pearce, the Court faced the question,
"[T]o what extent does the Constitution limit the
imposition of a harsher sentence after conviction
upon retrial?' 68 In North Carolina v. Pearce, the de-
fendant Pearce was convicted in a North Carolina
6" 251 U.S. at 22.
6Id. at 18.
6 Id.
" 386 P.2d at 686.
6 355 U.S. at 194-95 n.15. The Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut also argued that Green was clearly
distinguishable from Stroud and Kohifuss. Kohlfuss, 183
A.2d at 628.
67 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
68 Id. at 713.
court of assault with intent to commit rape and
was sentenced to prison for a term of from twelve
to fifteen years. His conviction was later reversed
by the North Carolina Supreme Court.6 9 On re-
trial, Pearce was convicted and sentenced to an
eight year prison term, which, when added to time
already served, amounted to a greater sentence
than was originally imposed. Pearce applied to
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that the increased sentence on retrial vio-
lated the double jeopardy clause. The district court
agreed with the defendant and reversed the con-
viction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.7"
In Rice v. Alabama,71 the defendant Rice pled
guilty in an Alabama court to four charges of
burglary and was sentenced to a total of ten years
imprisonment. These judgments were later set
aside in a state coram nobis proceeding. On retrial,
Rice was convicted of three of the original charges
and was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years
imprisonment. No credit was given to Rice for the
time he had spent in prison on the original judg-
ments. Rice brought a habeas corpus proceeding
in the federal district court, arguing that the Ala-
bama trial court unconstitutionally failed to give
him credit for the time he had served in prison
and that he was unfairly sentenced on retrial. The
district court held that he was denied due process
of law in the sentencing process of the second trial.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
on appeal.
72
The Supreme Court held that the double jeop-
ardy clause required that punishment already ex-
acted be fully credited when imposing sentence on
retrial for the same offense.73 The Court went on
to say that "[I]ong-established constitutional doc-
trine makes clear that, beyond the requirement
already discussed, the guarantee against double
jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length
of a sentence imposed upon reconviction." 74 The
Court cited Stroud, among other cases, to support
its conclusion regarding the scope of double jeop-
ardy protection noting that "at least since... Stroud
v. United States... it has been settled that a corol-
lary of the power to retry a defendant is the power,
upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose what-
6 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
70 397 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968).
71 Doc. No. 418. This was the companion case to North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
72 Simpson v. Rice, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
73395 U.S. at 718-19.
74 Id. at 719.
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ever sentence may be legally authorized, whether
or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after
the first conviction."
75
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall, dis-
agreed with the Court's explanation of the double
jeopardy clause protections. Citing Green, he argued
that the theory of double jeopardy was that a
person need "run the gauntlet" only once, and
that "if for any reason a new trial is granted and
there is a conviction a second time, the second
penalty imposed cannot exceed the first penalty,
if respect is had for the guarantee against double
jeopardy." 7 Justice Douglas rejected the govern-
ment's argument that there is a vital difference
between an increased sentence on retrial which
results from reconviction for the same offense, and
an increased sentence which results from defend-
ant's conviction on retrial for a higher offense than
that which he was originally convicted of. He
agreed with Justice Traynor's opinion in Henderson
and Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Green.
77
Justice Harlan also disagreed with the majority's
analysis of the double jeopardy clause and the
scope of the Green rule.
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in
support of the decision in Green applies with equal
force to the situation at bar.... [T]he concept or
fiction of an "implicit acquittal" of the greater of-
fense,... applies equally to the greater sentence: in
each case it was determined at the former trial that
the defendant or his offense was of a certain limited
degree of "badness" or gravity only, and therefore
merited only a certain limited punishment. 8
Despite these strong dissents, the Court expressly
noted that the rule of Green did not apply to the
situation at bar in that "[t]he Court's decision in
Green v. United States ... is of no applicability to
the present problem. The Green decision was based
upon the double jeopardy provision's guarantee
against retrial for an offense of which the defendant
was acquitted."79
The clear implication of this language and the
plain effect of the holding in Pearce is that the
implicit acquittal argument of Frankfurter, Tray-
nor and the ABA Advisory Committee has been
rejected by the Supreme Court.' A defendant is
75 Id. at 720.7
6 Id. at 726-27.
'7 Id. at 727-28.
78 Id. at 746.
7 Id. at 720 n.16.
' The Supreme Court has not clearly explained why
it has chosen to narrow the scope of the Green rule in the
not implicitly acquitted of all offenses deserving of
more punishment when he is initially sentenced.
This argument will not prevail in a challenge to
an increase of sentence on appellate review.
8 '
C. The Double Jeopardy Prohibition Against Multiple
Punishment
Another argument frequently advanced to sup-
port the proposition that the double jeopardy
clause prohibits an increase of sentence by appel-
late courts is based upon language from United
States v. Benz.s In that decision the Court con-
cluded:
Wharton ... says: "As a general practice, the sen-
tence, when imposed by a court of record, is within
the power of the court during the session in which
it is entered, and may be amended at any time
manner in which it did in Pearce. The Court has noted
that: "The vital thing is that it is a distinct and different
offense." 355 U.S. at 194 n. 14. When a legislature divides
a package of criminal activity into separate offenses and
attaches a range of punishment to each offense, it creates
public policy. It makes a general statement regarding
the culpability of each offense. When a judge or jury
imposes sentence on defendant, it is not making public
policy. It is merely applying policy previously made by
the legislature. The Court explained in Cichos v. Indiana,
385 U.S. 76 (1966), that the Green rule applied only when
the conviction of defendant on one offense necessarily
excluded a finding ofguilt by the factfinder on the other
offense. In the same vein, the Court noted in Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571, that an acquittal
"actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged."
This was restated in Lee v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
2141, 2146 n.8 (1977). When the factfinder decides which,
if any, crime the defendant has committed, it actually
resolves, correctly or not, some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged. In contrast, when the
sentencing official imposes sentence, he does not resolve
factual elements of the offense charged. He considers a
number of other factors (e.g., the rehabilitation of de-
fendant, the deterrence of potential offenders, the protec-
tion of society) in making his sentencing decision. There-
fore, his decision is not an implicit acquittal of defendant
of more culpable offenses.
84 The argument that the double jeopardy clause pro-
hibits the imposition of an enhanced penalty upon recon-
viction was raised in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,
119 (1972). The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
citing Pearce. The Pearce Court's analysis of the double
jeopardy clause protections was again reaffirmed by the
Court in Chaffin v. Styncheombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973).
In Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1976),
the Court once again relied upon Pearce to uphold the
Massachusetts two-tier court system against a double
jeopardy attack.
82 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
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during such session, provided a punishment already partly
suffered be not increased."
The distinction that the court during the same
term may amend a sentence so as to mitigate the
punishment, but not so as to increase it, is not based
upon the ground that the court has lost control of
the judgment in the latter case, but upon the ground
that to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to
double punishment for the same offense in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that
no person shall "be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This is
the basis of the decision in Ex parte Lange, supra.'0
1. The Benz Argument
In a prepared statement to a subcommittee of
the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, Professor
Peter W. Low explained this argument against the
constitutionality of increased sentence on appellate
review.' The argument proceeds from the premise
that the underlying justification for the Benz rule
is that defendant's jeopardy ends once the sentenc-
ing court has effectively imposed sentence. There-
after, the sentence cannot be increased by anyone
else without placing defendant twice in jeopardy.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered this argument in Robin-
son v. Warden, Mayland House of Correction."s In Ro-
binson, the defendant was convicted in the Criminal
Court of Baltimore for robbery and assault and
was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of ten
years. He applied for review of his sentence in
accordance with Maryland law, and the sentence
review panel increased the defendant's sentence
for the assault charge to fifteen years imprison-
merit. Defendant applied to the United States
district court for habeas relief, arguing that the
increased sentence violated the double jeopardy
clause. The district court denied his petition. In
the court of appeals the defendant, relying upon
the passage from Benz quoted above, argued that
the double jeopardy clause barred an increase of
sentence on appeal. The Fourth Circuit rejected
this argument. 86
To fully understand the Fourth Circuit's reason-
ing, a closer look at Benz is required. In Benz.
defendant pleaded guilty to a Prohibition Act vi-
olation and was sentenced to a term of imprison-
"i'Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
, See Hearings Befort the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judicia. Measures
Relating to Oiganized Crime, 91st Cong, 1st Sess. 195-96
(1969) (statement of Professor Low).
00455 F.2d 1172 (1972).
00 Id. at 1175-76.
ment of ten months. He filed a petition in the
federal district court, asking that the sentence be
modified. The court thereupon reduced the term
of imprisonment to six months. The government
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the
following question to the Supreme Court:
After a District Court of the United States has
imposed a sentence of imprisonment upon a defend-
ant in a criminal case, and after he has served a
part of the sentence, has that court, during the term
in which it was imposed, power to amend the sen-
tence by shortening the term of imprisonment?
8 7
This was the only issue before the Court in the
case, and it was answered affirmatively.8s The
Court's entire discussion of the unconstitutionality
of increasing a sentence was merely dictum. The
statement that to increase a sentence violates dou-
ble jeopardy is dictum. Furthermore, this statement
was supported by the citation of only one case, Ex
parte Lange.'0 Therefore, in order to ascertain the
correctness of the court's dictum in Benz, one must
consider Lange.
2. An Analysis of Ex parte Lange
In Lange, the defendant was convicted of stealing
mail bags from the United States Post Office. The
appropriate sentencing statute provided that the
punishment for this offense was imprisonment for
not more than one year, or a fine of not less than
ten dollars, nor more than two hundred dollars.
The judge at the defendant's trial sentenced him
to prison for one year and ordered him to' pay a
S200 fine. The defendant was committed to jail in
execution of the sentence. He also paid the fine to
the clerk of the court who, in turn, paid the same
into the United States Treasury. The defendant
filed for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
legality of his sentence. An order was entered by
the judge who presided at Lange's trial, vacating
the illegal sentence, and Lange was resentenced to
one year's imprisonment from that date. The de-
fendant filed for a second writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the new sentence. A writ of certiorari
was issued to the circuit court by the Supreme
Court in order to bring the proceedings before the
Court.
90
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the
case by noting that there is a general power of the
87 282 U.S. at 306.
0
8ld. at 311.
9 85 U.S. (15 Wall.) 163 (18741.
9" ld. at 164. '
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trial court over its own judgments, decrees and
orders, during the existence of the term at which
they were made. However, the Court explained,
there are limits to this general power of the court.
One of these limitations is the constitutional pro-
hibition against double punishment.
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of
England and America, it is that no man can be
twice lawfully punished for the same offense .... [T]here
has never been any doubt of its [this rule's] entire
and complete protection of the party when a second
punishment is proposed in the same court, on the
same facts,for the same statutory offense...
... The protection against the action of the same
court in inflicting punishment twice must surely be as
necessary ... as protection from chances or danger
of a second punishment on a second trial
... [We do not doubt that the Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice
punished for the same offense as from being twice tried
for it.
2
What is the nature and scope of this prohibition
against double punishment? The Lange Court ex-
plained that this protection arises from the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.93 More-
over, the Court noted that the protection provides
defendant with a bar to double punishment for
the same offense whether the second punishment
is inflicted by the same court or by a different
court at a subsequent trial.
The question, when is a defendant "twice pun-
ished for the same offense?," is more difficult to
answer. What is "double punishment" or a "second
punishment"? The Lange Court held that the de-
fendant in that case was punished twice for the
same offense.' It explained that the trial court
had erroneously imposed both of the statutory
punishments, prison term and fine, when it had
the power to impose only one. Once the defendant
had paid the fine and that money had passed
beyond the legal control of the court, any further
punishment was double punishment. This was be-
cause the S200 fine was one of the alternative
maximum punishments provided by the statute
91 This was established by Bassett v. United States,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 38 (1869). The Court noted, however,
that that case did not consider or decide the question of
the power of a court to increase a sentence. 85 U.S. at
167.
92 85 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 168-69, 173 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 170.
94 Id. at 176.
for the crime, and any punishment in addition to
the statutory maximum was prohibited.' Thus,
punishment that is greater than the statutory max-
imum punishment is multiple punishment.
Lange suffered double punishment for another
reason, as well. He was resentenced to a year's
imprisonment by the trial court after he had al-
ready full, suffered a valid alternative portion of
the original sentence. The Court explained:
We are of opinion that when the prisoner ... had
fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to
which alone the law subjected him, the power of
the court to punish further was gone. That the
principle we have discussed then interposed its
shield, and forfbade] that he should be punished
again for that offence.
6
Thus, once the defendant fully serves a valid sen-
tence for an offense, it is double punishment to
punish him again for that offense.
It is double punishment to punish the defendant
for an offense after he has fill), suJfered a valid
sentence for that offense. This remains true even
if the original sentence which has been fully suf-
fered by the defendant can be compensated for
by the government. This is the holding of In re
Bradley.97 In Bradley, the defendant was convicted
of contempt of court because of his intimidation
of a witness. He was sentenced to six months
imprisonment and a fine of S500. The sentencing
statute provided for the punishments as alterna-
tives. The defendant paid the fine and was com-
mitted to prison. Later that day, the court realized
its error in sentencing the defendant and amended
the sentence by omitting the fine. The court in-
structed the clerk to refund the fine money to the
defendant. The defendant refused to accept the
refund money and successfully petitioned the Su-
preme Coutt to consider his case. The Supreme
Court ordered the defendant freed.9" The Court
explained that when the defendant paid the fine
to the clerk, he "complied with a portion of the
sentence which could lawfully have been im-
posed."99 Furthermore, the Court cited Lange as
authority for its holding that:
As the judgment of the court was thus executed so
as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative
penalties of the law, the power of the court was at
95 Id. at 175-76.
9 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
97 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
98 Id. at 53.
9Id. at 52.
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an end .... Since one valid alternative provision of
the original sentence has been satisfied, the peti-
tioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint. 10
It is double punishment to punish a defendant
for an offense after he has fully served a valid
sentence for that offense even if the sentence fully
served by a defendant was not the statutory max-
imum sentence for the offense. This is the holding
of State v. Heyward.t 0 ' There, the defendant was
convicted for a violation of the narcotic drug stat-
ute and was sentenced to a prison term of from
five to seven years. The defendant appealed his
sentence in accordance with Connecticut law. The
sentence review division reviewed the sentence and
decided that it should be increased. It directed the
court to impose a sentence of from five to ten years
imprisonment. The court imposed said sentence;
however, it did not do so until more than seven
years after the original sentence was given. The
defendant appealed from this judgment increasing
his sentence. The Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors set aside the judgment. 10 2 It explained that
since defendant had fully satisfied his original sen-
tence before the increased sentence was imposed,
he was entitled to be a free man. "To subject him,
instead, to another, and more severe, judgment for
the same offence ... placed him again in jeopardy
for the crime for which he had already paid the
penalty."'°
3
In Robinson, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recognized the limited scope of the holding
of Lange, the sole support for the Benz dictum. This
limited holding provided the foundation for the
court's opinion, which rejected the defendant's
double jeopardy argument.
The increase in Robinson's punishment is not similar
to Lange's. When Robinson's sentence was reviewed,
he had not served his initial sentence. While the
Maryland statute authorized the review panel to
increase his sentence, it did not subject him to
multiple punishment by superimposing a new sen-
tence on one already served .... We find no sugges-
tion that by dictum the Benz Court intended to
broaden Exparte Lange's interpretation of the double
jeopardy clause.'"3
"oo Id. at 52. Chief Justice Stone dissented, arguing
that there was no substance to defendant's contention
that he would suffer double punishment if he were com-
pelled to serve his prison sentence. Id. at 53 (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting).
10 152 Conn. 426,7207 A.2d 730 (1965).
102 207 A.2d at 732.
1a Id. at 731 (citing exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873)).
'04 55 F.2d at 1176.
The Lange holding does not support the Benz
dictum. Simply because it is double punishment
to impose another penalty on defendant after he
has fully suffered an initial penalty, it does not
necessarily follow that it is double punishment to
increase a penalty which defendant has not yet fully
suffered. The Lange Court asked:
[Ihf the judgment of the court is that the convict be
imprisoned for four months, and he enters immedi-
ately upon the period of punishment, can the court,
after it has been fully completed, because it is still
in session of the same term, vacate that judgment
and render another, for three or six months' im-
prisonment, or for a fine?' 03
The Court quickly answered the question. "Not
only the gross injustice of such a proceeding, but
the inexpediency of placing such a power in the
hands of any tribunal, is manifest."'" This conclu-
sion follows from the holding of the Court that it
is double punishment to impose a new punishment
on the defendant after he has fully suffered the
initial penalty.
3. Rejection of the Benz Argument
There is language in Lange, however, which is
arguably broader than its holding:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection
against more than one trial if there can be any
number of sentences pronounced on the same ver-
dict? Why is it that, having once been tried and
found guilty, he can never be tried again for that
offense? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy
of being a second time found guilty. It is the punish-
ment that would legally follow the second conviction
which is the real danger guarded against by the
Constitution. But if, after judgment has been ren-
dered on the conviction, and the sentence of that
judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again
sentenced on that conviction to another and differ-
ent punishment, or to endure the same punishment
a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any
value? Is not its intent and its spirit in such a case
as much violated as if a new trial had been had,
and on a second conviction a second punishment
inflicted?
10 7
One may choose to read the above passage
without taking into consideration the factual
setting of the case. If so, one could argue that
the rule of this passage is that the double
105 85 U.S. at 168.
106 id.
07 id. at 173. The Benz Court relied upon this lan-
guage. 282 U.S. at 308.
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jeopardy clause prohibits any increase of sen-
tence once defendant has begun to serve that
sentence.15 However, this argument is difficult
to reconcile with other holdings of the Supreme
Court.
Murphy v. Massachusetts 9 is one such case.
In Murphy, the defendant was convicted on
multiple counts of embezzlement and was sen-
tenced to a term of from ten to fifteen years
imprisonment. After serving nearly three years
of the prison term, the defendant succeeded
in overturning his sentence on the ground that
he was sentenced under a statute which was
unconstitutionally applied to him. The defend-
ant was resentenced under the proper sentenc-
ing statute to nine years, ten months and
twenty-one days, which, when added to the
time already served by the defendant, totaled
twelve years and six months. The defendant
appealed his case to the Supreme Court. Mr.
Louis D. Brandeis, and others, argued on be-
half of the defendant that he was put in double
jeopardy when, after the execution of a sub-
stantial part of the original sentence, the court
imposed a new and larger sentence. Mr. Bran-
deis relied upon Lange to support this argu-
ment.
11 0
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument, noting that there, unlike Lange, "the
original sentence had not been fully satisfied." '
The Court went on to explain that:
The mere fact that ... he had served a portion of
the erroneous sentence could not entitle him to assert
that he was being twice punished .... [T]he plea of
former jeopardy or of former conviction cannot be
maintained because of service of part of a sentence,
reversed or vacated on the prisoner's own applica-
tion.
11 2
Two other cases, Flemister v. United States' 3 and
158 There is a series of federal cases in which the courts
have chosen to interpret this passage and the Benz case
in such a manner. See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 10, at
336 nn.55 & 57.
109 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
11044 L. Ed. 711, 712.
"1 177 U.S. at 160.
112 Id. at 161-62. In United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d
486, 488 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit cited Murphy in a footnote. However,
the court appears to have overlooked the scope of its
holding. Murphy had been cited as good law in Pearce.
395 U.S. at 720 n. 16. I agree with dissenting Judge Ross
that the district court should have been affirmed in that
case. Pearce and Murphy are the controlling precedents.
113 207 U.S. 372 (1907).
Ocampo v. United Statei," 4 create problems for ad-
vocates of a broader reading of the language in
Lange. In Flemister, the defendant struck a police
officer who was attempting to arrest him after he
had assaulted another person. The tburt of first
instance in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
originally sentenced the defendant, but the Phil-
ippine Islands Supreme Court increased the sen-
tence on defendant's appeal."1 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, noting
that defendant's objection to the increase of sen-
tence on appeal was disposed of by Trono.1
6
In Ocampo, a number of defendants were con-
victed of libeling a member of the Philippine Com-
mission. The Manila court of first instance sen-
tenced the defendants to imprisonment and fines.
On defendants' appeal, the Philippine Islands Su-
preme Court increased the sentence of one defend-
ant from nine to twelve months imprisonment.
'1 7
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions on appeal, citing Flemister and Trono.1
8
In neither of these cases did the Supreme Court
hold that the increase of sentence was double pun-





North Carolina v. Pearce120 has apparently shut the
door to the double punishment argument. In Pearce,
the Court specifically noted that it was the double
jeopardy's prohibition against multiple punish-
114 234 U.S. 91 (1914).
"'On appeal the Philippine Supreme Court re-ex-
amined the evidence adduced at trial and concluded
that the defendant was guilty of a more serious offense
than his original conviction reflected. It therefore im-
posed a more severe penalty on him. 5 Philippine 650,
655-56 (1906).
116 207 U.S. at 374. The facts of Flemister are not very
clearly presented in the United States Supreme Court
opinion. The Philippine Islands Supreme Court opinion,
5 Philippine 650 (1906), presents a more detailed factual
setting of the case. Flemister can arguably be read as an
illegal sentence case, but it need not be read in that
fashion.
117 The Philippine Supreme Court increased defendant
Kalaw's sentence after reviewing the trial record and
weighing a number of other factors. 18 Philippine 1, 57-
58 (1910).
118 234 U.S. at 102-03.
t'9 It is true that Trono was restricted by the Supreme
Court in Green. However, the Court has never expressly
undercut the holdings of Flemister and Ocampo. These
cases provide substantial support for the proposition
discussed above. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160
(1947), is another case that undercuts the argument that
the Benz dictum is good law. There, the Court permitted
a federal district court to increase an initial sentence
erroneously imposed to the statutory minimum sentence.
120 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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ment which was being considered in the case. 12 1.
Relying upon Lange, the Court held "that the
constitutional guarantee against multiple punish-
ments for the same offense absolutely requires that
punishment already exacted must be fully
'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new convic-
tion for the same offense."'"1 However, the Court
held that beyond this requirement, the multiple
punishment prohibition "imposes no restrictions
upon sentencing upon reconviction."' 23 If the
Court believed that an increase in sentence was
double punishment, it would have adopted the
rule of Patton v. North Carolina.' In that case, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, citing
Lange, specifically held that the double jeopardy
prohibition against multiple punishment prohibits
an increase in a defendant's sentence, once service
of the sentence has commenced.' 25 In failing to
consider the Patton rule, the Court effectively re-
jected the double punishment argument outlined
above.
26
The series of lower federal court cases 2 7 holding
that a court may not increase a sentence after
commencement of the sentence by defendant is
best explained in the following manner:
The decisions applying the dictum of United States
a. Benz ... must be understood as applying the
double jeopardy clause in view of the absence of
statutory or case law authorization for sentence in-
crease by an appellate court. Since, according to
statutory and common law, only the trial court can
consider increasing the sentence, it was necessary to
determine when the sentencing proceeding in the
trial court had ended and the sentence had therefore
become final. The beginning of service of sentence
was a sensible point in time to select for various
reasons.... The time when the sole sentencing pro-
ceeding ended, once fixed, then marked the end of
sentence jeopardy. Thus, those decisions did not
consider whether statutory provision of appellate
review of sentences would, by postponing sentence
12 Id. at 717.
'Id at 718-19.
23 Id. at 719.
124 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
905 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
relied upon Patton when it ordered Pearce's release.
125 Id. at 645.
126 Professor Low commented on the impact of Pearce
as follows. "[Tihe double jeopardy and equal protection
arguments that could be made against an increased
sentence on appeal are weakened if not completely de-
stroyed." Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 84 at 544.
127 See Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 10, for a sampling
of these cases.
finality, also postpone the end of sentence jeop-
ardy.'
28
These cases do not provide convincing authority
for the proposition that appellate increase of sen-
tences is prohibited by the double punishment
prohibition of the double jeopardy clause. That
argument has been substantially rejected by the
Supreme Court.
D. Government Appeals of Sentences
This section will examine whether the double
jeopardy clause presents any special obstacles to
statutes providing for increase of sentence on ap-
peal by the government. The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit has stated that it does. In Walsh
v. Picard,"2 5 the First Circuit considered a challenge
to the Massachusetts procedure providing for in-
crease of sentence on appellate review initiated by
the defendant, stating in dictum that, "the Mas-
sachusetts procedure does not permit the state to
reopen the question of sentence on its own initia-
tive. Were it to do so, it would of course violate
the proscription against double jeopardy."'
' x
Frankel is one of a series of lower federal court
cases relying upon the Benz dictum. As we have
seen above, 131 the Benz dictum does not support
the statement made by the court of appeals. An
increased sentence on appeal is not a violation of
the double jeopardy clause, unless credit for time
already served in prison is not given to the defend-
ant,132 or the sentence is increased after defendant
has already fully served the initial sentence.'33 This
is the law, regardless of who initiates appellate
review of a sentence. The same is true of the
inapplicability of the "implicit acquittal" concept
to increased sentences on appeal.
A theory that would suggest double jeopardy
difficulties in increased sentences on government
appeal is a waiver or forfeiture argument. The
argument is that an increase of sentence on appeal
is per se a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
However, when defendant appeals his sentence, he
128 SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. Doc. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1969).
129 446 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
921 (1972).
'30 Id. at 1211 (citing United States v. Benz, 282 U.S.
304 (1931) and Frankel v. United States, 131 F.2d 756
(6th Cir. 1942)).
131 See text accompanying notes 75-120 supra.
132 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
133 Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (15 Wall.) 163 (1874).
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waives or forfeits his double jeopardy protections.
This theory has never found favor with the
Supreme Court. Moreover, it is an unsatisfactory
method ofjustifying increased sentences on appeal
by defendants. Justice Holmes recognized the fic-
tion of this theory in his dissent in Kepner:
It cannot matter that the prisoner procures the
second trial.... [A] man cannot waive, and certainly
will not be taken to waive without meaning it,
fundamental constitutional ights.... Usually no
such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it
cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a
prisoner the correction of a fatal error, unless he
should waive other rights so important as to be
saved by an express clause in the Constitution of
the United States."3
The Green Court was persuaded by Justice Holmes'
argument and specifically rejected the waiver ra-
tionale.
"Waiver" is a vague term used for a great variety
of purposes, good and bad, in the law. In any normal
sense, however, it connotes some kind of voluntary
knowing relinquishment of a right .... [I]t is wholly
fictional to say that he "chooses" to forego his con-
stitutional defense of former jeopardy .... 13
The Supreme Court restated its rejection of the
waiver theory in Price13 and in United States v.
D initz.
i7
More importantly, the Court declined to adopt
the waiver theory in Pearce. Noting that the ratio-
nale for permitting an increased sentence on retrial
has been variously phrased, the Court explained
that "it rests ultimately upon the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest,
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean.
' ' tss
Although it is difficult to ascertain the Court's
rationale from this language, it is doubtful that
this language is simply a formulation of the waiver
theory." It is also very unlikely that it is an
'34 195 U.S. at 135 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135 355 U.S. at 191-92.
"3 398 U.S. at 328.
17 424" U.S. 600 (1976). "This court has implicitly
rejected the contention that the permissibility of a retrial
following a mistrial or a reversal of a conviction on
appeal depends on a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of a constitutional right .... " Id. at 609 n. 11.
538395 U.S. at 72 1.
' 9 The fourth circuit does not believe that Pearce's
rationale is the waiver theory. "The result we reach is
not dependent on waiver or the concept of continuing
jeopardy. It rests instead on the lesson Pearce teaches-the
double jeopardy clause is not an absolute bar to increased
punishment." Robinson, 455 F.2d at 1175.
adoption of the "continuing jeopardy" theory of
Justice Holmes. That theory has recently been
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in both
United States v. Jenkins"4 and United States v. Wil-
son.
1 4 1
E. The Common Law Pleas of Autrefois Acquit and
Autrefois Convict
What did the Court mean when it said that
"the slate has been wiped clean"? What theory of
double jeopardy will reconcile the holdings of the
Supreme Court in this area? The Court hinted at
this theory over seventy years ago when it stated
that:
There is also the view to be taken that the constitu-
tional provision was really never intended to, and,
properly construed, does not cover the case of a
judgment under these circumstances, which has been
annulled by the court at the request of the accused,
and there is, therefore, no necessity of relying upon
a waiver, because the correct construction of the
provision does not make it applicable.
142
In order to make "the correct construction of the
provision," the Court has suggested that the double
jeopardy clause be "construed with reference to
the common law from which it is taken."' 4' The
common law background of the double jeopardy
clause has been discussed frequently by the Su-
preme Court in its cases during the past century.'"
From these discussions, the conclusion arises that
the double jeopardy clause provides defendants
with the protections of the common law pleas of
autrefois acquit (plea of former acquittal) and autrefois
convict (plea of former conviction)." These two
pleas provide defendant with different protections
and are designed to accomplish different goals. As
one commentator noted:
[A] former conviction raises problems different from
those that grow from a former acquittal. And the
bases of the two pleas are different. If the first trial
140 420 U.S. 358 (1975). "[T]he 'continuing jeopardy'
concept that was articulated by Mr. Justice Holmes ..-
has never been adopted by a majority of this Court." Id.
at 369.
141 420 U.S. 332 (1975). "[W]e have rejected this posi-
tion in the past, and we continue to .... Id. at 352.
142 Trono, 199 U.S. at 534.
.4 Kepner, 195 U.S. at 125.
144 See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977),
Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340-42; Green, 355 U.S. at 187; Kepner,
195 U.S. at 126-27; Ball, 163 U.S. at 666-68; Lange, 85
U.S. at 168-73.
,4sSeeJ. SIGLR, DOUBLEJEOPARDY ch. 1 (1969).
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results in a conviction, the criminal is protected
against a renewal of the prosecution by the moral
precept, found in natural law, that no one ought to
be punished twice for the same wrong ... . But a
plea of former acquittal rests on another maxim...
It is a rule of policy adopted by the courts to put
an end to litigation.'4 6
A person convicted of a criminal offense is pro-
vided by the double jeopardy clause with protec-
tion against being punished twice for the same
offense. This is the protection of autre/ois convict. As
explained above, this double jeopardy protection
does not prohibit an increase of sentence on appeal.
A person acquitted of a criminal offense is pro-
vided by the double jeopardy clause with protec-
tion against being tried again for the same offense.
The acquittal puts an end to the litigation. This is
the protection of autrefois acquit. As in the case of
autrefois convict, this double jeopardy protection does
not prohibit an increase of sentence on appeal.
F. The Double Jeopardy Protection Against a Second
Prosecution For the Same Offense After Conviction
In Pearce, the Supreme Court noted that the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy consists of three separate constitutional pro-
tections: "It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction. And it protects against multiple
punishment for the same offense."' 147 Having al-
ready discussed the protection against a second
prosecution following acquittal and the protection
against multiple punishment, we shall now examine
whether the protection against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after conviction presents
any obstacles to appellate increase of sentences.
1. An Analysis of Snow and Nielsen
The Pearce Court cited but one case, In re Niel-
sen,' 48 as authority for the proposition that the
double jeopardy clause protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
In order to fully understand Nielsen, however, it is
necessary to be familiar with an earlier Supreme
Court case. Ex parte Snow. 149 Snow was charged in
three separate indictments with having unlawfully
146 Bigelow, Former Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11
Rt'r;ERs L. REv. 487, 490 (1957).
147 395 U.S. at 717, cited in Wilson, 420 U.S. at 343,
and Brown, 97 S. Ct. at 2225.
148 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
149 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
cohabitated with more than one woman. This was
a federal offense. Each indictment charged defend-
ant with having cohabitated with the same seven
women, but for different periods of time. He was
tried separately on each indictment and was con-
victed on each. He was sentenced to the maximum
statutory penalty of a S300 fine and six months
imprisonment on each conviction. The terms of
imprisonment were to be served consecutively.
Snow petitioned a Territory of Utah district court
for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that he
had paid $300 in satisfaction of one of the fines
and had been imprisoned for more than six months.
Therefore, any further imprisonment was unlawful
because the district court had no jurisdiction to
pass judgment upon more than one of the three
indictments. Since the offense set out in each was
the same, and the maximum punishment for that
offense, six months imprisonment and a S300 fine,
had already been fully served and paid, any further
punishment would constitute double jeopardy.
The district court denied Snow's petition, but
the Supreme Court reversed the district court on
appeal.15° The Supreme Court held that the offense
of unlawful cohabitation was inherently a contin-
uous offense. Moreover, since a continuing offense
could be committed but once, for purposes of
indictment or prosecution, prior to the time the
prosecution was instituted, the division of the of-
fense into three separate offenses was "wholly ar-
bitrary."'' Therefore, the Court concluded that
the trial court had no jurisdiction to inflict a
punishment in respect of more than one of the
convictions. 2 The Court reversed the judgment
of the trial court and remanded the case.
Clearly, Snow is a multiple punishment case. As
in Lange, the defendant in Snow was sentenced to
punishment greater than that provided for by the
statutory maximum. Once the defendant had fully
served the statutory maximum sentence, any fur-
ther punishment was double punishment.
In Nielsen, defendant was indicted for unlawful
cohabitation with two women under the same
statute involved in Snow. This indictment covered
a period of time ending on May 13, 1888. A second
indictment charged that Nielsen committed adul-
tery on May 14, 1888 with one of the women
whom Nielsen was accused of having unlawfully
cohabitated with under the first indictment. De-
fendant pleaded guilty to the first indictment and
'50 Id. at 286-87.
15 Id. at 281-82.
152 Id. at 285.
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was sentenced to three months imprisonment and
fined $100. After he had fully served the three
month sentence and paid the fine, Nielsen was
tried for adultery. He entered a plea of former
conviction, arguing that the unlawful cohabitation
charge included the adultery charge, in that the
unlawful cohabitation continued beyond May 13,
1888, even though the written indictment was for
a period ending on that date. Nielsen argued that
he had fully suffered the penalty prescribed for
the unlawful cohabitation and could not be pun-
ished any further for it. The district attorney de-
murred to this plea and defendant was convicted
on the adultery charge and sentenced to prison
for 125 days.
Nielsen's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the Territory of Utah district court.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
granted the writ and determined that the adultery
charged in the second indictment was a part of
the unlawful cohabitation charged in the first in-
dictment. Relying upon Snow, the Court explained
it's holding as follows:
The conviction on that indictment [unlawful coha-
bitation] was in law a conviction of a crime which
was continuous, extending over the whole period,
including the time when the adultery was alleged
to have been committed. The petitioner's sentence,
and the punishment he underwent on the first in-
dictment, was for that entire, continuous crime. It
included the adultery charged. To convict and pun-
ish him for that also was a second conviction and
punishment for the same offence."
The Court held that the conviction on the first
indictment was a bar to any prosecution on the
second indictment. Therefore, the trial court had
no authority to give judgment and sentence in the
latter case. The Court reversed the trial court's
judgment and remanded the case to the lower
court.15
Nielsen, like Snow, can be read as a multiple
punishment case. Unlike Snow, Nielsen was not
sentenced to the statutory maximum penalty on
his unlawful cohabitation charge. However, Niel-
sen had fully served the sentence he did receive for
that offense before he was tried on the adultery
charge. Therefore, like Snow, Nielsen fell lunder
the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple
punishment as described by the Court in Lange.
'63 131 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
Id. at 191.
2. An Analysis of Waller, Robinson and Breed
Nielsen and Snow may also be read in a broader
fashion. They can be read to support the proposi-
tion that a former conviction bars a retrial for the
same offense, regardless of whether there is multiple
punishment in the case. Three fairly recent Su-
preme Court cases, Waller v. Florida,ss Robinson v.
Neil'56 and Breed v. Jones,' can be read to support
this proposition as well.
In Waller, the defendant was convicted in mu-
nicipal court on two charges, destruction of city
property and breach of peace. He was sentenced
to 180 days in county jail. Later, Waller was con-
victed in a circuit court of Florida on a charge of
grand larceny. He was sentenced to from six
months to five years imprisonment, less the time
he had already served in county jail on the mu-
nicipal court convictions. The state charge and the
city charges were based on the same criminal acts
of the defendant. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that the city of St. Petersburg
and the state of Florida were the same sovereign,
and that the state trial of Waller for grand larceny
constituted double jeopardy.1ss
In Robinson, defendant was convicted in munici-
pal court of three assault and battery charges. He
was fined S50 for each offense. Later, he was
indicted by a state grand jury for three charges of
assault with intent to commit murder. These
charges grew out of the same conduct which gave
rise to the municipal court charges. The defendant
pleaded guilty to the state charges and was sen-
tenced to consecutive terms of three to ten, three
to ten, and three to five years imprisonment. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that Waller was
to be accorded full retroactive effect.1 9 The Court
remanded the Robinson case to the district court to
determine whether the state and municipal prose-
cutions were for the same offense. On remand, the
district court held that the offenses were the same
for purposes of double jeopardy, and ordered the
state convictions and sentences to be set aside.
60
In Breed, a petition was filed in California Juve-
nile Court, alleging that Gary J., age seventeen
years, had violated the criminal laws of California
and should, therefore, be adjudged a ward of the
15s 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
1s6 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
157421 U.S. 519 (1975).
158 397 U.S. at 394-95.
9 409 U.S. at 511.




court. More specifically, it was charged that he
committed an act which would have constituted
armed robbery if it had been committed by an
adult. An adjudicatory hearing was held, and the
Juvenile Court found that the allegations in the
petition were true. Later, the Juvenile Court de-
clared that Gary J. was unfit for treatment as a
juvenile, and it ordered that he be prosecuted as
an adult. An information was filed in Superior
Court, and Gary J. was tried and found guilty of
first degree robbery and committed to the Califor-
nia Youth Authority. The defendant filed for a
writ of habeas corpus in United States district
court, which denied the petition. The court of
appeals reversed that court's denial of the writ,
holding that the defendant had been placed twice
in jeopardy by the state trial which followed the
juvenile court hearing.' The Supreme Court
agreed with the court of appeals, holding that the
prosecution of the defendant in the Superior Court,
after the juvenile court adjudicatory proceeding,
violated the double jeopardy clause.
62
Like Snow and Nielsen, Robinson can be explained
as a multiple punishment case. Robinson was tried
in state court for assault with intent to commit
murder after he had fully served the sentences im-
posed on him by the municipal court for the assault
and battery charges (i.e., after he had paid the
three $50 fines). Viewed in this light, Robinson is
simply a Lange-type case which falls within the
doublejeopardy proscription against multiple pun-
ishment.
Unlike Snow and Nielsen, however, Waller and
Breed cannot be explained as multiple punishment
cases. In Waller, defendant had only served 170 of
the 180 days imprisonment imposed on him by
the municipal court at the time he was sentenced
for the state court charge. He had not fully served
the penalty. Moreover, the state trial court gave
Wailer credit for the time he had served on the
municipal convictions when it sentenced him. In
Breed, defendant received no definite punishment
following his adjudicatory hearing in juvenile
court. It was within the court's power to commit
him to the California Youth Authority until he
reached the age of twenty-one years. l" Clearly, at
the time he was tried in state court for robbery,
Breed had not fully served an initial sentence.
Therefore, neither Breed nor Waller was a double
punishment case.
Neither defendant was twice punished in these
161 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974).
162421 U.S. at 541.
'6 Id. at 529 n. 11.
cases. Yet, the Supreme Court held that they were
put in double jeopardy by the second prosecutions.
The Court did not discuss why the second prose-
cutions were violations of the double jeopardy
clause. Instead, it gave most of its attention to
other issues.'6 4 Furthermore, once the Court con-
cluded that the double jeopardy clause applied, it
assumed that that clause's protections had been
violated. The question arises, what double jeopardy
protection was violated in these cases? It appears
that it was the protection against a second prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction.16
3. The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Protection Against
a Second Prosecution for the Same Offense After Convic-
tion
Does double jeopardy protection against a sec-
ond prosecution provide an obstacle to an increase
of sentence on appeal? There is language in recent
Supreme Court decisions which suggests that the
purpose of this protection is to insure that the
defendant need only once endure the hardship of
one criminal trial for the same offense." The goal
of protecting the defendant from twice enduring
the heavy burden of marshalling his resources
against the state in a criminal trial is not frustrated
by allowing government appeal of the defendant's
sentence. To the contrary, a government appeal
seeking an increase of sentence is analogous to the
appeal permitted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Wilson." There, the Court explained that
"6 In Waller, the Court focused on the question of
whether the city of St. Petersburg and the state of Florida
were the same sovereign. In Breed, the Court considered
whether the protections of the double jeopardy clause
applied to persons involved in juvenile court proceedings.
These questions were answered by the Court affirma-
tively.
" In Brown, 97 S. Ct. at 2225, the Court held that a
previous conviction for a lesser included offense bars
later prosecution for the greater offense. The two offenses
are the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
The second prosecution is barred as a result of the double
jeopardy protection against prosecution for the same
offense after conviction. The Court noted that: "Where
successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee serves
,a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's
benefit' .... That policy protects the accused from at-
tempts to relitigate the facts underlying a prior acquittal
. .. and from attempts to secure additional punishment
after a prior conviction and sentence .... See also Jeffers
v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2207 (1977).
6 See, e.g., Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, 533; Wilson, 420
U.S. at 343-45; Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569 (1977).
'6 420 U.S. 332 (1975). In Wilson, the Court permitted
the Government to appeal the district court's grant of a
post verdict defense motion to dismiss the case.
[Vol. 69
INCREASING SENTENCES
although the Government's appeal would subject
defendant to continuing expense and anxiety, the
defendant had no legitimate doublejeopardy claim
because "that error could be corrected without
subjecting him to a second trial before a second
trier of fact."'" Similarily, although a government
appeal of sentence would subject a defendant to
continuing expense and anxiety, it would not vio-
late the double jeopardy clause because the error,
a too lenient sentence, could be corrected without
subjecting the defendant to a second trial. The
conclusion is, therefore, that the double jeopardy
protection against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction does not prohibit an
increase of sentence on appeal.
169
II. APPELLATE INCREASE OF SENTENCES AND
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
This section will examine whether the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
1
68 Id. at 345.
"69 The Pearce Court cited a Yale Law Journal Note to
support the proposition that the double jeopardy clause
consists of three separate constitutional protections. 395
U.S. at 717 n.8. That Note explained one of the policies
underlying the double jeopardy protection against retrial
for the same offense after conviction as follows: "Second,
the prosecutor should not be able to search for an agree-
able sentence by bringing successive prosecutions for the
same offense before different judges. Thus reprosecution
after a conviction is prohibited." Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262, 267 (1965). The question arises, if the
double jeopardy clause prohibits a prosecutor from
searching for an agreeable sentence by way of bringing
successive prosecutions for the same offense, why does it
not prohibit a prosecutor from seeking an agreeable
sentence by way of appealing the sentence? There is a
significant difference between a prosecutor's searching
for a "hanging judge" before whom to retry a defendant
and a prosecutor's appealing a sentence to an appellate
court. A sentence appeal is heard by an appellate court,
presumably the same court that hears all sentence appeal
cases in the jurisdiction. In an appellate review of sen-
tences system, a prosecutor cannot search for a particu-
larly harsh court in which to retry and resentence a
particular defendant. To the contrary, every defendant
whose sentence is appealed has his case heard before the
same appellate court. This court, over a period of time,
should develop and apply criteria for sentencing which
are both rational and just. The court will hear appeals
in cases where the original sentence imposed was too
lenient as well as cases where the original sentence im-
posed was too harsh. By empowering the court to increase
sentences when appropriate, the court has a mechanism
with which to deal with the problem of sentence disparity
(i.e., disparity which results from too great lenience in
sentencing at the trial court level). Rather than being a
part of the problem which the double jeopardy clause
was written to counteract, a system of appellate review
of sentences is a part of the solution to the problem of
sentence disparity.
an appellate court from increasing a defendant's
sentence on appeal without any new evidence to
support the increase. This question may be re-
phrased by asking whether the prophylactic rule
announced by the Pearce Court must be followed
by appellate courts in reviewing sentences on ap-
peal. That rule was stated as follows:
[W]e have concluded that whenever ajudge imposes
a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirma-
tively appear. Those reasons must be based upon
objective information concerning identifiable con-
duct on the part of the defendant occurring after
the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And
the factual data upon which the increased sentence
is based must be made part of the record .... 170
In order to determine whether or not the due
process clause requires that this rule be followed
by appellate courts in reviewing sentences, one
must examine the rationale of the rule. The Pearce
Court stated the rule's rationale. in this manner:
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked
his first conviction must play no part in the sentence
he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of
such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a
defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collat-
erally attack his first conviction, due process also
requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension
of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the
sentencing judge.
71
The dual purpose of the Pearce due process rule is
very clear. First, it is to ensure that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully at-
tacked his first conviction plays no part in the
resentencing process. Secondly, it is to ensure that
apprehension of such.,vindictiveness does not deter




Would these purposes be furthered by requiring
that appellate courts follow the.Pearce rule when
reviewing sentences? Colten v. Kentucky'"3 suggests
not. In Colten, the Court held that the prophylactic
rule of Pearce was not appropriate in the context
of Kentucky's two-tier court system." 4 This was
because the possibility of vindictiveness found to
exist in Pearce was not inherent in the Kentucky
system. Why? Because the court which imposed
17o 395 U.S. at 726.
'"Id at 725.
" Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1973).
173 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
1
'
74 Id. at 118.
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Colten's final sentence was not the same court with
whose work Colten was sufficiently dissatisfied with
to seek an appeal. No court was asked to do over
what it thought it had already done correctly. 7 '
Similarly, systems of appellate review of sentences
do not inherently possess the possibility of vindic-
tiveness found to exist in Pearce. Because an appel-
latejudge, not the trial judge, reviews the sentence,
the "resentencing decision [is not] based on im-
proper considerations, such as [the trial] judge's
unarticulated resentment at having been reversed
on appeal."' 76 The Walsh Court explained this
important distinction as follows:
[A] trial court which has been reversed and then
required to engage in a perhaps lengthy retrial, only
to end up where it started, may find it difficult in
the best of conscience not to feel some irritation
towards the defendant. The likelihood that an ap-
pellate court hearing a brief appeal would feel vin-
dictive seems to us far more remote.
77
Thus, because the appellate court will have no
personal stake in the prior sentence, it will have
-no motivation to engage in self-vindication. It will
be able to fairly assess the propriety of the sentence,
free from any realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.
The court's analysis in Chaffin v. Soynchcombe178 is
equally applicable to the appellate review of sen-
tences arena. There, the Court declined to require
that the Pearce rule be followed where resentencing
is performed by a jury rather than a judge. The
need to guard against vindictiveness is not as strong
in this case as it was in Pearce. Likewise, the hazard
of vindictiveness in appellate review of sentences
cases is not comparable to Pearce's. 179
Moreover, the purposes of the Pearce rule would
not be furthered in situations where it is the gov-
ernment who appeals the sentence and not the
defendant. In these situations, fear of vindictiveness
on the part of the defendant is nonexistent.
Two important distinctions between appellate
review of sentences proceedings and the Pearce sit-
uation, were noted by the Robinson Court.
The Pearce rule was designed to enable a defendant
who was wrongfully convicted to seek redress with-
out being deterred by fear of reprisal. However, a
prisoner seeking sentence review is not faced with
the dilemma of either remaining in jail under an
"'lId. at 116-17.
176 Payne, 412 U.S. at 53.
117 446 F.2d at 1212.
178412 U.S. 17 (1973).
t79 Id. at 24-28.
invalid conviction or of risking harsher punishment
if he is convicted on retrial. Sentence review deals
only with the justness of punishment .... The very
purpose of sentence review is to reconsider and
reevaluate information bearing on the appropriate-
ness of the prisoner's punishment. Ideally, review
should quickly follow sentencing, and it is not de-
signed to examine a defendant's conduct in the
interim. Therefore, the sanction fashioned in Pearce
to assure due process is inappropriate for sentence
review. 18°
First, the dilemma that the defendant faces in
an appellate review of sentences situation is not as
grave as that faced by Pearce. The defendant need
not choose between either remaining in jail under
an invalid conviction or risking a harsher punish-
ment if he is convicted on retrial. The only issue
dealt with on appeal of a sentence is the propriety
of the punishment. This is a significant difference
from Pearce.
Seciondly, the very timing and nature of sentence
review make the Pearce rule inappropriate. The
process calls for a re-evaluation of the same infor-
mation available to the trial judge at the initial
sentencing. There will not always be an interim
period in which the defendant may conduct him-
self in such a manner as to justify an increase in
his sentence. The application of the Pearce due
process rule in appellate review of sentences situa-
tions would effectively negate the system. Thus it
is very unlikely that an appellate court on review
of a sentence would be required to follow the
prophylactic rule of Pearce.
CONCLUSION
It is not a violation of either the double jeopardy
or due process clauses of the United States Consti-
tution for an appellate judge to increase a defend-
ant's sentence on appeal, even where there is no
new evidence to support the increase.
If an increase of sentence on retrial following
reversal of a conviction does not violate the double
jeopardy clause, then an increase of sentence on
appeal of the sentence by the defendant is also
non-violative of double jeopardy. An analysis of
three areas demonstrates that increase of sentence
on retrial following reversal of a conviction does
not violate the double jeopardy clause.
A. The double jeopardy protection against being
'80 455 F.2d at 1176-77. See also State of Montana v.
Henrich, 162 Mont. 114, 509 P.2d 288 (1973).
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prosecuted for the same offense following acquittal
is not violated. Ball and Kepner establish the prop-
osition of the finality of a verdict of acquittal. Green
establishes that even an implicit acquittal provides
this protection. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Jus-
tice Traynor and the ABA Advisory Committee
argued that the implicit acquittal concept of Green
applies equally to the sentence. Yet, this argument
has been rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Stroud, Green and Pearce.
B. The double jeopardy protection against mul-
tiple punishment is not violated. Arguably, the
Benz dictum provides support for the proposition
that an increased sentence on appeal is double
punishment. However, Benz relies upon Lange, and
the holding of Lange is much more limited than
the Benz dictum. Multiple punishment is a penalty
greater than the statutory maximum or the impo-
sition of further punishment after a legal sentence
has been fully suffered by a defendant. The lan-
guage in Benz cannot be reconciled with holdings
of the Supreme Court in Murphy, Flemister, Ocampo
and Pearce.
C. The double jeopardy protection against being
tried for the same offense following conviction is
not violated. This protection insures that the de-
fendant will not be subject to multiple prosecutions
for the same offense. Appellate review of sentences
does not subject a defendant to multiple prosecu-
tions.
Government appeals of sentences are also not
prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. Waiver
or forfeiture theories of double jeopardy and the
continuing jeopardy theory of Mr. Justice Holmes
have not been accepted by the Court. Therefore,
government appeals are permitted to the same
extent as are defendant appeals. In addition, the
double jeopardy clause provides a.defendant with
the common law protections of the pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict, but these protections do
not prevent government appeal of sentences.
The due process issue revolves around whether
or not the prophylactic rule of Pearce applies to
appellate review of sentences. The purpose of this
rule is to insure that vindictiveness plays no role
in the sentencing process and does not deter de-
fendants from appealing convictions. The vindid-
tiveness problem is not a realistic one in the appel-
late review of sentences setting because a different
official reviews the sentence than the one who
imposed it. The defendant is not faced with a
dilemma the magnitude of Pearce's. The nature
of the appeal process is different than the process
involved in Pearce. The rule of Pearce does not apply
in these cases, as is demonstrated in Colten and
Chaffin.
1978]
